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We are against Islam! This is a great battle of civilisa-
tion for the Lega Nord! We cannot allow Islam to 
colonise us!
—Alessandro Savoi  
(Lega Nord, in dirittodicronaca.com, 2010)
Natives and the Swamp
My voice is deliberately raised and undiplomatic 
because “we” Padani refuse to be involved with the 
cunning Roman swamp (a derogatory reference to the 
centre of Italian politics describing the inability of 
national politics to address issues) that does not see 
that as everything dies, “we” [Padani] seek change 
(Umberto Bossi—leader of the Lega Nord [LN]).1
Islam and its stereotypical representation are at the fore-
front of a variety of global anxieties (Allen, 2010; Esposito 
& Kalin, 2011; Fekete, 2009; Gottschalk, 2007; Sayid & 
Abdoolkarim, 2011), many of which have attracted of those 
with Far-Right sympathies (Cheles, Ferguson, & Vaughan, 
1995; Davies, 2002; Ellinas, 2010; Price, 2008). That said, 
the fears and panics engendered by Islam in many Western 
political circles are hardly novel, they go back as far as the 
era of the Crusades, and stereotypical discourses on Muslims 
preceded the September 11th, 2001, Al-Qaeda terrorist 
attacks in New York and the July 7th, 2005, attack on the 
London transport network (Wellington, 2009). Since these 
latter episodes, however, “Islam” and “Muslims” have 
become, with the help of the media, inextricably linked with 
terrorism and political fanaticism (Poole, 2006). The dis-
courses of fear surrounding Islam find fertile ground in 
contemporary Italy for two reasons. First, Italy has been 
politically, bureaucratically, psychologically, and culturally 
unequipped to tackle the social impacts of mass immigra-
tion (Mignone &Coppa, 1995). The Roman Catholic organi-
zation Caritas (Caritas Migrantes, 2011) estimates that today 
some 4 million immigrants reside in Italy, 1,500,000 of 
which are Muslims. Of these Muslims, 500,000 are Italian 
citizens. More than 250 Muslim places of worship now exist 
in Italy (Ruppi, 2010). Second, Italy is the quintessential 
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Abstract
Since 1995, the Italian Lega Nord (LN) political party has depicted itself as the defender of Padania, a territory that covers 
the mainly affluent regions of Northern Italy. Around this politico-spatial territory, the LN has shaped an identity based 
on the notion of Popolo Padano (the Padanian People). Since the new millennium, LN rhetoric has increasingly focused—
stemming more from the demands of realpolitik than those of conviction—on opposing irregular immigration per se and, 
more specifically, Islam and Muslim immigration. In the eyes of the LN propagandists and their media, the theology of Islam 
and its practitioners represent a growing threat to the modern Italian and Padanian identity (and tradition). The LN has not 
been alone in using the media to oppose Islam; the Italian media has reinforced LN messages; Muslims are generally depicted 
as dangerous and compared with terrorists and their religion and culture are described as the opposite of Italian/West values. 
Something approximating to a “moral panic” around this issue has ensued. Integral to this are notions of morality combined 
with practices of moral entrepreneurship. What follows seeks to highlight the LN’s stereotypical depictions of Islam. This 
evaluation is important because the LN was a major player in former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi’s government (2008-
2011) and is still a significant party among the Italian political spectrum. Integral to what follows are the following questions: 
“Is contemporary Islamic immigration a threat to the Italian (and Padanian) way of life?” and “Are the perceived threats to be 
found in the periodic uncertainties that societies suffer or might we need to search for wider processes?”
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“liquid society” (Bauman, 1998, 2000). Such a society is 
characterized by the absence of strong institutions, an over-
whelming fear of unemployment and general uncertainty 
about the future. Bauman’s assertion about the inability of 
the liquid State to be the “certainty producer” definitely 
holds in the case of Italy where a political class seems inca-
pable of addressing—among many pressing issues—the 
North–South divide, which forever fractures the country’s 
economy and psyche. In the eyes of many, Italy is a “sick” 
country affected by constant fear (Morici, 2010). Prominent 
among these fears are those relating to Islamic terrorism and 
Muslim immigration. In this framework, Muslims have 
become the perfect representative of Bauman’s “underclass”; 
this demographic is perceived as a threat to social order by 
an increasingly fearful indigenous public who are subject to 
perpetual economic insecurities. In this milieu, new political 
movements have emerged.
This article attempts to analyze the LN’s construction of 
Islam using the concept of the moral panic (Cohen, 1972; 
Ben-Yehuda & Goode, 1994). Drawing on data expounded 
variously on Youtube, Facebook, the LN’s main websites 
(LegaNord.org; studentipadani.com; giovanipadani.leg-
anord.org; associazionipadane.leganord.org), the webvideo 
channel TelePadania, the official LN radio channel 
RadioPadania, the party’s official newspaper La Padania, 
and the online newspaper Il Padano, the authors seek to 
examine the rationale behind the strategy of the LN, which is 
a significant player in Italian politics. In seeking to ascertain 
the reality surrounding the perceived threats represented by 
contemporary immigrations to an ancient way of life, the 
article seeks to locate the true Padania origin and locate the 
perceived threats within the periodic uncertainties that soci-
eties suffer—threats which contribute to the debate about 
moral panic.
Methodological Notes
This article has followed a constructionist paradigm (Berger 
& Luckmann, 1967). Constructionists take language analy-
sis seriously, conceiving it as a tool to create reality. This 
vision is crucial when a researcher wants to evaluate how 
language strengthens ethnic identity. This article attempts to 
emphasize the contraposition of two “versions” of ethnicity 
that the LN promotes; namely, the Padania people (Us) and 
the Muslims (the others).
The Internet—a crucial “storehouse” of readily available 
and up-to-date information (Sade-Beck, 2004)—was consid-
ered an appropriate medium to collect the data to highlight the 
Moral Panic–inducing discourses of the LN relating to Islam.
To evaluate the data, discourse analysis was utilized. 
Blanche and Durrheim (1999) define discourse analysis 
(DA) as “the act of showing how certain discourses are 
deployed to achieve particular effects in specific contexts” 
(p. 154).
Van Dijk (2000 in McGregor, 2010) acknowledges that 
DA does not have a unitary theoretical framework or meth-
odology because it is best viewed as a shared perspective 
encompassing a range of approaches However, three factors 
should be highlighted when DA is performed: the discourse 
in the text, how the effect is achieved in a text, and the con-
text in which the text functions.
The first action is to distance oneself from the text and to 
identify binary oppositions (good–bad; true–false); recurrent 
themes, phrases, and metaphors; the subjects of the texts; 
and the author and the listener. The second, to be executed 
simultaneously, is to understand the effect of the discourse: 
What do the texts do? For instance, do they promote a par-
ticular ideology or motivate readers to act in a specific way? 
These aims can be explicit, implicit, or both (Blanche & 
Durrheim, 1999). In seeking answers, the researcher needs to 
explicate the broader context within which texts operate 
(Blanche & Durrheim, 1999).In performing the analysis, this 
study has strictly followed the warranting criteria identified 
by Wood and Kroger (2000), namely, “Trustworthiness”—
delivered by the clarity and orderliness in which the study 
was conducted, recorded, and reported and qualified by an 
audit—and “soundness”—which accounts for exceptions 
and alternatives and makes sure that analyses is plausible 
and persuasive.
Analysts choose certain texts and decide how to delimit 
these texts and how to analyze them to achieve certain effects 
(Blanche & Durrheim, 1999). The analyst must thus “try to 
extract him/herself from living in culture, [but] to reflect on 
culture” (Blanche & Durrheim, 1999, p.101). This is the aim 
in what follows.
La Lega and the Electorate
Popularly referred to as Lega, the Lega Nord per 
l’Independenza della Padania (the Northern League for the 
Independence of Padania) is the largest party in the Veneto 
region of Northern Italy and the second biggest in the 
Lombardy region. Famous for its slogan “Roma ladrona” 
(Rome is a big thief), the party appealed to many Italians 
disillusioned with the political class that brought the 1980s 
political crisis, ever-remembered as Tangentopoli 
(Barbaceto, Gomez, & Travaglio, 2002). The first appear-
ance of the LN occurred in 1979 when small autonomist 
groups (Leghe) emerged with the aim of giving areas 
(regioni) of the northern Italian regions autonomy from the 
Italian capital, Rome. For such people, the political class 
located in Rome did not serve their interests. In 1989, the 
Lega Nord movement was constituted and included other 
leghe such as the Lega Lombarda, Alleanza Toscana, Union 
Ligure, Lega Emiliano-Romagnola, il Piedmont Auto-
nomista, and la Liga Veneta.
Politically and ideologically, the LN has proven ephem-
eral. It had—and still has—a populist appeal but does 
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not correspond to any Right-Left-Centre orientation. Pro-
Catholic, socially conservative, and Eurosceptic, its leader 
Umberto Bossi once described the party he led as “libertar-
ian and socialist.” Secessionist in origin, the LN settled for 
pursuing federalism in later years. The Lega had electoral 
success and has placed its elected members in high office. 
The 1992 general election saw the LN win the fourth high-
est number of votes (StoriaXXIsecolo.it, 2010). The fol-
lowing year, a league candidate was elected as Mayor of 
Milan. The 1994 general election saw the Northern League 
attract 8.3% of the vote, a figure that rose to 10.6% 2 years 
later.2 Plagued by splits, by 2001, the figure was down to 
3.9%. In the 2008 general election, the LN ran as a partner 
in the Movement for Autonomy and polled 8.3% (La 
Repubblica, 2008). Four of its politicians received ministe-
rial posts in the “axis of the North” government of Silvio 
Berlusconi; the LN leader Umberto Bossi held the office of 
Minister of Federal Reform. In the European Council elec-
tion, the LN’s proportion of the vote rose from 8.1% in 
1989 to 10.2% at the 2009 election, a figure which afforded 
nine Members of the European Parliament (MEP). Other 
groups sharing the ideology of the LN are highly active at 
local level in Padania, notably the Donna Padana (Women 
of Padania movement), the Movimento Studentesco Padano 
(Padania Students Movement), and the Movimento Giovani 
Padani (Padania Youth Movement).
The political nature of the LN is hotly debated, notably 
regarding whether or not it should be classified as an extreme 
right party or a populist movement (Albertazzi, 2006). 
Considered influential in the country’s movements in pre-
venting the arrival of sea-borne illegal immigrants, the LN 
has a somewhat chequered record on the issue of migration 
and has the stigma of being anti-immigrant and xenophobic. 
In 2003, Bossi suggested that Italian authorities open fire on 
the boats carrying such migrants (La Repubblica, 2003). 
In-depth and recent sociopolitical/historical accounts of the 
LN are available in the works of De Matteo (2011), Biorcio 
(1997, 2010), Peruzzi and Paciucci (2011), and Pandolfi 
(2011). Without a doubt, the LN displays the traits typical of 
a populist political actor, led as it is by the charismatic 
Umberto Bossi. As Der Brug and Mughan (2007) argue, the 
charismatic leader “is obeyed not by virtue of a custom or a 
law, but by virtue of the faith he inspires” (p. 31). The main 
determinant of the successful charismatic leader is his or her 
perceived personal and exceptional merits (Charlot, 1971). 
Bossi is perceived by his electorate as an outsider, forever 
fighting the political battles taking place in Rome. Bossi por-
trays the LN as the only tool to fight the corrupt “profes-
sional Roman politician,” and implicitly, cultural and 
“ethnic” pride. His words strike at the heart of many Italians; 
Bossi appeals to millions of voters, many of whom see them-
selves as the bulwark of what it is to be both “Padani” and 
“Christian.” To understand the LN construction of the 
Muslim Folk Devils which will be highlighted later in this 
article, it is also important to consider the specificity of the 
LN among the Italian centre-right political panorama.
The other major party on the Italian centre-right is the 
Popolo delle Libertà (PdL), formerly led by Silvio 
Berlusconi. The PdL, together with the LN, formed Italy’s 
government from May 2008 to November 2011. Although 
the two parties can both be classified as populist, they have 
their own specificity and differences; the LN’s populism is 
embedded in a loathing for the Italian politics and a strategy 
of harnessing Padanian consensus; this form of populism 
also has an ethnic component which links populism to the 
LN’s nativist sentiments (Ruzza & Schmidtke, 1993). It is 
these sentiments that frame perceptions of those entering 
Italy from without.
The journeys made by immigrants to Italy are frequently 
hazardous and sometimes end in death at sea in the case of 
those leaving Africa. Seeking a better lifestyle than that pro-
vided by their indigenous states, the hundreds of thousands 
who arrive on the shores of Italy are in many cases in transit 
and see the peninsula as a stepping stone to the perceived 
greater potential of Northern Europe or the eventual nirvana 
that is the United States. They move inspired by a wish to 
join the “winning” side. In pursuit of this, they suffer exploi-
tation and poverty and run the risk of being the recipients of 
violence from the host people who do not appreciate their 
presence nor want to hear of their plight. As “aliens”—be it 
long term or short term—they provoke fear; their presence is 
perceived as polluting. They are not People Like Us, and in 
the eyes of those who would demonize them most they 
will—consciously or unconsciously—undermine an estab-
lished way of life. A crucial dimension in this state of affairs 
was identified by anthropologist Hans Lucht (2012) whose 
ethnographic study of Ghanaian migrants to Italy’s southern 
shores examined the reaction they evoked and argued that 
the issue of reciprocity between the newly arrived and the 
indigenous was crucial. For Lucht, channels of reciprocity 
were empowering, manifesting a commitment to share which 
provides for a degree of trust. Such a model is idealized; 
immigrants vary widely in their need or desire to reciprocate. 
As Lucht (2011) argues, when economic circumstances for 
the native-born are poor, the newly arrived face questions as 
to what use they are for the host society? They can soon 
become unwanted. When stories abound about their moral-
ity, they become Folk Devils; people become moralistic. At 
some stage this can cause a panic.
The LN’s ethno-populism is conducive to just such panic. 
It is motivated by the need to engineer consensus by creating 
and sustaining a feeling of otherness. The dynamic is simple; 
it sets the Padania people against outsiders; the stronger the 
message, the more successful is the appeal to the people, as 
it creates a strong sense of collective identity. As mentioned 
earlier, this populist and nativist ideology is different from 
that expressed by its ally, PdL. The latter has a political com-
ponent made up by socialist, Christian democrats and 
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liberals, which has depended on the charisma of its former 
leader Silvio Berlusconi for a measure of its political suc-
cess. All of Berlusconi’s political proclamations express a 
form of populism which is not territorial or ethnical, but 
based on antipolitical and antiparty messages (Ruzza & 
Fella, 2011) and the pride of being Italian, hence the name of 
the party that he founded Forza Italia (Go Italy); this popu-
lism is more confined to his favored mode of communication 
and its appeal to the vices and virtues of every Italian.
The LN can also be considered a nativist movement 
(Hague, Giordano, & Sebesta, 2005). Nativism originated in 
19th-century United States as a reaction to growing European 
immigration (Betz & Meret, 2009). The core issue of 
nativism concerns the assimilability of diverse peoples in a 
multicultural society, specifically the extent to which the 
“outsiders” are culturally (and religiously) compatible with 
the majority indigenous population and the likelihood of 
them being absorbed into the latter.
Nativists are advocates of an identity based on the idea 
that the basic order by which people (us) live is better than 
how “the others” live (Taylor, 2006). Nativism can thus be 
interpreted as a “cultural defence” against those who chal-
lenge social cohesion (Betz & Meret, 2009). The nativism 
expressed by the LN has been present since the origin of the 
party in the perceived clash of civilizations between the 
“people of the nord,” represented by the LN, and the lazy and 
corrupt southerners; however, the tragic happenings of the 
9/11 2001 shifted this political discourse and focused more 
and more on Muslims. Schmidt di Friedberg argued that
After September 11, the generalised prejudice against 
Muslims increased, often reacting, within institutions, 
in an indirect and legalistic way. For example, in the 
Bergamo area (Lombardy) some Muslim prayer rooms 
were closed on the ground (very likely perfectly true) 
that some safety requirements were not respected. 
Islamophobia displayed itself fully during the year 
2000 for reasons that have less to do with the behav-
iour of Muslims in Italy than with Italian internal 
social and political balances.3
Samuel Huntington (1997) claimed contentiously that civi-
lizations have a natural inclination to clash and that religion is 
a crucial element in identifying a civilization. The LN sub-
scribe to a similar mind-set. For its members and sympathizers, 
social interaction does not accustom social groups to “others” 
but instead underlines the differences between such groups. 
Although in catholic Italy the LN has been a central protagonist 
in this differentiation process, it has not acted alone; well-
known journalists and writers such as Oriana Fallaci have 
highlighted the clash of civilization between Islam and Italy, 
favoring the construction of the Muslim Folk Devil.
In a 2005 interview with the Wall Street Journal, Oriana 
Fallaci stated that
Europe is no longer Europe . . . It is “Eurabia,” a 
colony of Islam, where the Islamic invasion does not 
proceed only in a physical sense, but also in a mental 
and cultural sense. Servility to the invaders has  
poisoned democracy, with obvious consequences for 
the freedom of thought, and for the concept itself of 
liberty. (The New York Times, 2006)
This resentment “infected” many Italians and promoted 
the LN’s objective of finding yet another scapegoat to use as 
a stimulus to reinforce the Padania identity (Ignazi, 2005). 
In what follows, the authors describe how the LN represents 
the Muslims of Italian society as a threat to the cohesion of 
both Italy and Padania. As a consequence, the LN has been 
intransigent in debates surrounding immigration, and have 
conducted “crusades” against the opening of mosques and 
the promotion of cultural practices linked to Islam. A sense 
of panic is evident here, as is moral entrepreneurship. But 
what, we need ask, is it that needs protecting?
The Padanian Nation: Transitions and Virtues
The LN Padania identifies itself with the wealthy regions in 
the North of Italy, namely, Liguria, Piedmont, Lombardy, 
Valle d’Aosta, Trentino Alto Adige, Veneto, Friuli Venezia 
Giulia, Emilia Romagna, Tuscany, Umbria, and Marche. 
However, the very notion of Padania is controversial. 
Recently, Gianfranco Fini, the President of the Italian House 
of Representatives—the second most important political 
figure after the President of the republic—declared that 
“Padania is simply a fortunate lexical invention for propa-
ganda” (La Repubblica, 2010). The LN’s response was 
immediate; the influential LN exponent Roberto Calderoli—
then a minister in Berlusconi’s government—argued that to 
deny the identity of Padania was like arguing that the Earth 
was flat (Fiammeri, 2010). Such debates will not go away. 
Meanwhile, the LN has had to sustain itself.
Since its origin, the LN has needed to construct an “eth-
nic” identity for the northern regions of Italy that promotes a 
sense of self. This strategy relies on its promotion of a sense 
of “difference” and detachment from the rest of the country. 
This was needed to achieve its political target of separating 
from the body politic of Italy using the political strategies of 
either secession or federalism, depending on political expe-
dience. A new society based on a strong Padanian identity is 
envisaged and sought by the LN proponents. This “new” 
society would be based around shared symbols, rituals, and 
most importantly, language. Symbols—such as il sole delle 
Alpi (the sun of the Alps)—is crucial to the LN’s strategy, 
symbolizing, as it does, the Celtic Rose which represents the 
assumed common Celtic ethnic heritage of the Padania pop-
ulations (Oneto, 1997, p. 6). This Celtic heritage aims to 
bring Padania closer to the populations of northern Europe 
and to provide “an additional ethnic explanation to its 
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previously articulated relation between regional identity and 
an entrepreneurial culture” (Huysseune, 2010, p. 228).
Traditions have also been invented to assist the LN in the 
pursuit of its aims (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983). For 
instance, one of the LN’s main public displays is the March 
25th gathering at Pontida, begun in 1990.4 This, now annual, 
gathering celebrates the 1167 Oath of Pontida which pro-
moted the constitution of the Lombard League (LL), an 
entity founded to oppose the Emperor Federico Barbarossa. 
The LN discourses centre on Alberto da Giussano, the leg-
endary leader of the LL, who led a coalition of towns from 
the Lombardia region in armed conflict against Barbarossa. 
The 1176 Battle of Legnano symbolized the victory of the 
northern people against the central hegemonic power of the 
emperor. This victory has become a metaphorical weapon to 
be deployed against the politics of the centralist Roman-
Italian state.
In shaping its sense of ethnic identity, the LN concomi-
tantly identifies a series of virtues assumed to be common to 
the Padani and expounded in a document of the Youth 
Padana Manifesto5 which states,
The Young Padani live by the history, tradition and 
culture of their ancestors and their land. The value of 
loyalty to their peers, inner honesty, brotherhood, con-
sistency in their objectives, constant work, integrity 
are all moral values that distinguish the mass from the 
Young Padano . . . From time immemorial we live, 
work, protect and love these lands, handed down by 
our ancestors crossed by the waters of our great rivers. 
La Padania is our pride, our greatest resource and our 
only chance to freely express ourselves respecting our 
individual traits and collective feeling . . . We, the 
Peoples of Padania solemnly proclaim: La Padania an 
independent and sovereign Federal Republic. In sup-
port of this cause we offer ourselves, a mutual pledge, 
our lives, our fortunes and our honor.
The term Padania is obsessively repeated in the above 
Manifesto as is the case in any political action presided over 
by the LN; this strategy states unequivocally—and repeat-
edly—the existence of this “imaginary” territory and ethnic 
group. Values such as the ethic of work, combined with hon-
esty, integrity, and social cohesion, are stressed within the 
traditions of Christianity.
This has political and moral consequences for some 
groups. Via language and discourses of fear, the LN has cre-
ated an external threat to their people. These threats are 
needed to unite the Padania people. La Padania is, hence, 
considered here as a version of existence created via dis-
course and reinforced via constant discourses comprising 
representations and “social practice” (Domanski, 2003). A 
sense of “Moral Panic” ensues. But what constitutes a moral 
panic?
The Moral Panic: Structures and Agents
At root the moral panic is about instilling fear in peo-
ple and, in so doing, encouraging them to try to turn 
away from the complexity and the visible social prob-
lems of everyday life and either to retreat into a “for-
tress mentality”—a feeling of hopelessness, political 
powerlessness and paralysis—or to adopt a gung-ho 
“something must be done about it” attitude. (McRobbie, 
1994, p. 199)
The concept of moral panic is mostly associated with the 
academic discipline of criminology and the work of Stan 
Cohen (1972) and Jock Young (1971). According to the 
former,
Societies appear to be subject, every now and then, to 
periods of moral panic. A condition, episode, person or 
group of persons emerges to become defined as a 
threat to societal values and interests; its nature is pre-
sented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the 
mass media; the moral barricades are manned by edi-
tors, bishops, politicians and other right-thinking 
people; socially accredited experts pronounce their 
diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are evolved 
or (more often) resorted to; the condition then disap-
pears, submerges or deteriorates and becomes more 
visible. (Cohen, 2002, p. 1)
Crucial to any explanation of Moral Panic are definitions 
of outsider groups presented in a stylized and stereotypical 
manner. These groups are defined or perceived as a threat to 
the wider societal values and interests, and opinions about 
them are voiced by the socially accredited experts (Cohen, 
1972). Such panics occur in the arguments of Cohen (1972) 
when society is unsure of itself or is in the process of relocat-
ing its boundaries. In such scenarios, the moral panic drama-
tizes the issue at stake. At times, there may well be behaviors 
that test existing societal boundaries. At other times, the 
behavior now censured was always evident but is now less 
tolerated. Power is thus crucial to any analysis; some groups 
who lack it are vulnerable to attacks and stereotyping. 
Crucially, in the words of Cohen, “The manipulation of 
appropriate symbols—the process which sustains moral pan-
ics, campaigns and crusades—is made much easier when the 
object of attack is both highly visible and structurally weak.” 
Specific social phenomena are constructed to produce gener-
alized and exaggerated public anxiety.6
Moral panics are thus to be considered social construc-
tions characterized by a disproportionate reaction to a per-
ceived danger. Crucial to such processes are media and 
political representations. Generally, the social issues which 
are the focus of this social construction have existed in some 
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different form in the past and are represented by politicians 
and others as “new” or subject to an increase in magnitude. 
The consequent impact on society is often exaggerated with 
“unfounded” statistics voiced to incite a political reaction. A 
variety of moralizing agents are at the origin of these social 
phenomena. These agents have an interest in perpetuating 
the anxiety (Jenkins, 1996).
We should, however, not forget the full title of Cohen 
(1972), that is, Folk Devils and Moral Panics. The Folk 
Devil might best be understood as a socially constructed 
Ideal Type identified as a threat. This was not particularly 
elaborated on by Cohen, but we suggest that the work of 
Becker (1963) can be drawn upon in considering how the 
label is inseparable from the symbol and, furthermore, how 
this duality enters public consciousness. As Al-Natour (2010) 
acknowledges, the various panics highlight a constant revival 
of the leading actor of the panic, namely, the Folk Devil 
which, as Ben-Yehuda and Goode (1994) detail, is the per-
sonification of evil. The construction of the moral panic 
seeks to strengthen the dominance of the established value 
system at a time of perceived social crisis (Donson, Chesters, 
Welsh, & Tickle, 2004).
The political dimensions of the Moral Panic can be 
implicit or explicit and have in the eyes of some aficionados 
of the paradigm related to the orchestration of consent. This 
sees the media and judiciary assume the role of vox populi 
and thus, in the case of the media, can claim to speak on 
behalf of the general public, while the latter can claim to act 
on the strength of public opinion (Downes & Rock, 1988). 
More explicit political analysis was evident in the analysis of 
Hall, Clarke, Critcher, Jefferson, and Roberts (1978) who 
saw in the response of the media and judiciary to the phe-
nomenon of “mugging” a crisis of hegemony in the capitalist 
system of the United Kingdom which left a divided and 
embittered society. The ensuing “war” on crime perpetuated 
by alien (i.e., non-White, Caribbean-born immigrants) saw 
the rise of the “law and order” society as the political system 
sought to reassert itself and manufacture consent using cross-
class fears of crime perpetrated by “different” people.
The term moral panic is a contested one, being applied to 
the perception and reaction of many diverse phenomena. 
Many of these applications issue from a preoccupation with 
media content and ignorance of the sophisticated schema 
that Cohen (1972) drew up. With its origins in disaster 
research theory (Baker & Chapman, 1962), Cohen’s para-
digm was constituted by a nine-event schema. These events 
could be categorized into three blocks; the first inventory, 
which he called “media,” consisted of
1. Exaggeration and distortion
2. Prediction
3. Symbolization
In this time, those exposed to the issue assess the event 
and its effect. Then came the phases known as Reaction 
(Part 1), which focuses on opinions and attitudes, and 
Reaction (Part 2). In the former, the stages of Orientation, 
Images, and Causation were evident and in the latter, which 
might best be termed the rescue and remedy phase, the fea-
tures were Sensitization, Societal Control, and Exploitative 
Culture. According to Cohen (1972), all nine elements need 
to be present for an event to be defined as a moral panic. 
Interestingly, Cohen introduced the notion of entrepreneurs 
in articulating the idea of the moral panic but did not elabo-
rate bar noting the decline of the lower-middle class. The 
role of the moral crusader is not one that Cohen developed.
Moral crusades have a long history (Bristow, 1977). The 
work of Jenkins (1992) combines the notion of moral panic 
with explanations around the constructs of moral entrepre-
neurs, symbolic crusades, and social problem theories and 
presents their origins and causation. Those behind the cru-
sade can be individuals, interested agencies, or those tasked 
with law enforcement (Thompson, 1994). Crucial to his 
analysis is the question regarding how an issue becomes a 
problem. This requires our knowing who the people are that 
raise matters to the status of a problem, and on top of this we 
must be aware of the resources available to such people to 
publicize and sustain the issue. Ultimately, we should address 
the nature of the “ownership” of the matter. This has implica-
tions in social theory, notably around the notions of social 
anxiety and interest groups and is thus pertinent to 
Durkheimian and Marxist theory. The latter was evident in 
the debates around “mugging” (see above); the former would 
argue that the Folk Devils so crucial to the moral panic 
debate assist in the reassertion of the established value sys-
tem at times of perceived solicitude (Thompson, 1994).
Other theorists have attempted to conflate a host of para-
digms that correspond to these concerns. In Ben-Yehuda 
and Goode’s (1994) text titled Moral Panics, the authors 
compress Cohen’s nine elements into the following five 
components:
1. Concern: levied toward the behavior of a previ-
ously labeled category,
2. Hostility: which should accompany the above,
3. Consensus: widespread acceptance of the problem 
is needed,
4. Disproportionality: a subjective quality but neces-
sary for inducing fear, and
5. Volatility: moral panics can erupt at any time.
Four criteria are then introduced to constitute the panic: 
deviance, social problem, collective behavior, and social 
reaction. They then introduce three models of moral panic:
1. Grass-Roots: based primarily in spontaneous pub-
lic concern sometimes triggered by an incident,
2. Elite-Engineered: when fear is begun intentionally 
to nurture concern and fear, and
3. Interest-Group: when individuals—rule creators 
and moral entrepreneurs—launch crusades that 
occasionally turn into panics.
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Crucially, the Elite-Level model does not fit Cohen’s 
theory and is more about moral crusading. The Interest-
Group model similarly does not fit the Cohen moral panic 
model; moral panics are not the same as moral crusades. The 
latter requires an entrepreneur to intervene in seeking to save 
society from “threat” they have identified (Becker, 1963).
Analysts of “Moral Panic” cannot ignore the media. 
Words and images are integral to the entrepreneur getting 
his or her message across and in providing him or her with 
a “hierarchy of the credible” according to which their atti-
tudes and opinions are promoted. However, crucially this 
promotion occurs after the initial reporting and disturbance. 
The threat that the entrepreneur expounds may have existed 
for a long time and may not be considered problematic. 
Other variables enter the field to confuse our analysis. 
Hostility toward the Folk Devil can be small and/or muted, 
and then suddenly be amplified. Consequently, the crucial 
quality of the entrepreneur/crusader he or she is never easy 
to pin down. Any argument about “Moral Panic” is thus 
impressionistic and somewhat speculative. Moral outrage, 
however, has its appeal; addressing the roots of a social 
problem is laborious and sometimes too revealing of soci-
etal imbalances and injustices. It usually requires a number 
of interventions. In such scenarios, stereotypical depictions 
and fears are easier to deal with. There may well be electoral 
advantage in the demonization of those who do not have the 
same avenues of response.
Depictions and Discourses of Islam
The Islamic communities located in the Padania  
territories increasingly seek to impose unacceptable 
behavior in our schools to our students such as the 
removal of crucifixes from the classrooms, the disap-
pearance of the traditional Christmas Crib, the gender 
separation of classes rooms, the absolute prohibition 
of certain foods such as ham in the food canteens, and 
the introduction of the chador (and the Burqa), this is 
a dangerous road towards the erasure of the most 
basic civil rights, against the Italian Constitution 
which all the “Roman” parties [Italian political par-
ties which do not care about the interest of Padania] 
they pretend to be the legit defenders . . . The Lega 
Nord with this document will put a stop to the spread 
of this progressive decay of values and symbols that 
distinguish our identity [Padanian identity].7
From the words presented above, it is possible to identify 
what Van Dijk (2006) terms the ideological square, namely, 
the contemporary, positive, self-representation of an in-
group (in this instance, the LN and the Padanian people) 
against the negative, other-presentation of the out-group (in 
this instance, Muslims). Belief systems are crucial to this 
duality. The people of Padania and the LN present them-
selves as representative of the last defenders of Italian and 
European Christianity and its symbol of the crucifix. The LN 
article depicts Islam as the main source of the contemporary 
disappearance of the Christian symbol from Padanian public 
places. This same symbol is considered a tool of unity and 
belonging for the Padano. Muslims are “immigrants” which, 
instead of complaining should thank the people of Padania 
that they are able to live in Padania. The tone is one of anger, 
taking offence at the possibility that another religion can be 
offended by the symbols of another belief system. It ques-
tions why a guest should seek to insult the host, but it does 
not express panic. Crucially, the article was written in 2002 a 
few months after the Al-Qaeda attack on the World Trade 
Center. Anger is expressed in subtle ways against the forces 
that should be active .A 2009 editorial of the La Padania 
newspaper in 2009, titled “Another Lepanto to Stop Islam,” 
argued
Today the Church is afraid. It does not fight. The 
church is pacifist at any cost. You cannot make peace 
with those who do not want to! On the contrary, as the 
Latins said, si vis pacme para bellum: sometimes the 
war—metaphorical or otherwise—is necessary just to 
achieve peace . . . theirs not a Pope like Pope Pius V, 
someone or something is missing capable of creating 
a strong coalition between the forces of Christianity. 
And who would be the glue? The fortress is today the 
LN, we are the barrier. But it is not enough: “What is 
needed is strong and widespread reaction in Europe. 
Because the enemy is coming, indeed has infiltrated 
into our society, it corrodes our society from the inside 
while at the same time attack from the outside.” I wish 
there still existed the “priest-soldier Templars.” What 
do we need to do? The LN know that Islam is on the 
march, while we are just watching. We Need a new 
Lepanto, otherwise they [Muslims] will occupy the 
entire West . . . the supporters of the centre-right coali-
tion are warned from today the LN becomes the “Holy 
League.” (Macchi, 2009, p. 1)
In this article, the Muslims (as a collective) are depicted 
as the oppressors of the (equally collective) il Popolo 
Padano. The latter is encouraged to resist them to avoid 
jeopardizing their freedom and way of life. The text exempli-
fies topicalization (Huckin, 2002). Words are carefully cho-
sen to sustain a “perspective” that influences the target 
audience, namely, the people of Padania. The LN link with 
“us” reinforces group identity and presents the LN as a voice 
with a legitimate grievance.
The LN seems in this text to want to incite violence to 
stop Islam. The editorial not only identifies the LN and 
Padani as the new 21st-century Knights Templars but also 
refers to the October 7th 1571 Lepanto battle celebrated 
every year by the LN militants. On October 7th 2010 the LN 
of the Region Marche conducted a religious service, depos-
iting a laurel wreath into the Adriatic Sea (off Lepanto) 
which contained the message “Defending Christianity to the 
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Death.” The deposition was accompanied by a speech from 
the LN regional leader, Enzo Marangoni, who recalled the 
16th-century battle stating, “The Christian army lost 15 
ships with 7,650 men, 7,780 were injured. 15,000 Christians 
were freed from the Turks.”8 Marangoni also used this occa-
sion to declare the wish of the LN to promote a regional law 
to commemorate the battle annually adding, “remember this 
event that has marked the history of Europe . . . Remember 
where we came from and commemorate those who lost their 
lives to get us where we are today is an imperative duty of 
the present and future generations.” History and heroism are 
invoked to celebrate Us against Them. Regret is voiced 
about the absence of the religious warrior prepared to die for 
the cause. The enemy is identifiable and is at the gate of 
civilization. Something has to be done.
An important element of the LN construction of Islam is 
the clear distinction they seek to portray of the superior 
(Christian-Padanian) self and the evil (Islamic) Other. Islam 
is not only portrayed as a monolith but as a belief system 
synonymous with acts of terrorism (mainly against 
Christians), and a theocracy intent on undermining one of 
the most important values of the “true” Padano: the nuclear 
and extended family. The Muslim Folk Devil will go to great 
lengths to right that considered wrong and is thus both devi-
ant and a danger to many innocent people. Even a painting 
can provoke the Muslim Folk devil to violence.
In June 2009, the online LN newspaper, Il Padano, wrote 
an article titled “The Muslims Want Us Dead” (Il Padano, 
2009a). On the same page was a picture of Giovanni da 
Modena’s iconic 15th-century painting, Muhammad in Hell. 
The fresco depicts a scene from Dante’s Inferno which sees 
the prophet Muhammad being devoured by demons as he 
enters Hell. In recent times, Islamic militants have claimed 
that the image is an insult to Muslims. Two attempts to 
destroy the image and the structure it exists in have been 
thwarted by the Italian police. In 2002, five Muslim men 
linked to Al-Qaeda were arrested as they plotted to blow up 
the church. In 2006, another plan to destroy the building 
was discovered by the Italian police. The words published 
alongside the image address the recent arrests of suspected 
Muslim terrorists in Italy. The author argues the following:
1. RISKS OF MASSACRES AT BOLOGNA AND 
MILAN. Once again, we have been almost near [to be 
hit], a terrorist Muslim group, operating since 2003, had 
already planned bloody attacks in Milan and Bologna in 
respect of [the prophet] Muhammad. Now the butchers 
of the Jihad, five North African arrested for terrorism, 
are all safely in jail; four were already in jail abroad, 
while the fifth was arrested in the [immigration] deten-
tion center of Caltanissetta [Sicilian city].
2. NEUTRALISED. With these arrests the Muslim 
structure to which other north Africans—already 
arrested—belonged is practically neutralized . . . The 
Carabinieri General Giampaolo Ganzer can be legiti-
mately happy: “Once again—he said—the combined 
investigative-judicial system of prevention and 
repression has worked.” The high rank police officer 
confirmed that the group was a “concrete threat” and 
that the targets selected would have cause horrendous 
massacres.
3. MUHAMMAD IN HELL. The Islamic terrorists 
targeted the Milan underground and the Muhammad in 
hell painting. Targeted by Islamic terrorists was in fact 
the Milan subway and the Basilica of St Petronio in 
Bologna which hosts the famous painting of 
Muhammad in Hell.
4. BUTCHER’S SHOP. The LN MEP Mario 
Borghezio stated about this news: “The Maghreb ter-
rorists were ready to implement the usual bucher’s 
shop Islamic attacks in Milan and Bologna: once again 
this proves that the alert launched by us [Lega Nord 
Padania] is true and real. What will the forever anti 
Lega Nord say [now] about us, [about the LN] who 
opposes the proliferation of mosques and fundamen-
talist Islamic centers where foreign Imams preach—
using the Arab language—to hate us, our religion and 
our civilisation. (Il Padano, 2009a)
The use of double meanings and the striking imagery of 
the painting get the reader’s attention. The Muhammad in 
Hell image, used by Il Padano, suggests—very subtly we 
might surmise—what the Padani and the Lega Nord Padania 
(LNP) would like to see. If the writer had wished to avoid 
such insinuations, he could have toned down the headline. 
Terms such as butcher’s shop and want us dead connect the 
mosque to terrorism and suggest that Muslims hate “Us” 
[La Padania] and “our” civilization. And what should be 
done? One paragraph congratulates the political efficiency 
of the state but at the same time highlights the contributions 
of the LN to this struggle. The LN—a reader is led to 
believe—is politically responsible for the success of the 
police raids. At the time of writing, the Minister of the 
Interior (the man in charge of the Italian national security) 
was Roberto Maroni, a LN politician second to only 
Umberto Bossi in terms of seniority.
For the LN, a “moderate” Islam is not conceivable. The 
fear of both colonization and cultural invasion diffused by 
Islam among il Popolo Padano is well explained, reiterated, 
and added to a new fear evident in the popular LN banner 
titled “NO. Let’s stop the Islam invasion.” The banner, which 
displays the national flag of Turkey, summarizes the position 
of the LN regarding Turkey’s efforts to join the European 
Union (EU). In the following speech recorded from the LN 
Radio’s Padania Libera Channel the party’s concerns about 
the prospect of Turkey becoming a member of EU are 
expounded by the LNP MP Alberto Torazzi.9
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In the [Italian] parliament every political party agree—
except the LN—to allow Turkey to become member of 
the EU. Turkey is a country of 85 million Muslims 
with 40 million under the age of 25; in Germany—an 
influential country—they have done a survey to 
understand how things will go, 20 million Turks under 
the age of 25 want to emigrate to other European 
countries. If these people emigrate, it will be a catas-
trophe for Italy. Some 3-4 millions of these people will 
need our welfare state without considering all the mess 
that is linked with dealing with a Muslim country 
[Turkey]. Against this horrible catastrophe that is 
about to hit Europe; the only party that strongly 
opposes is the LNP. I invite all the citizens, who have 
voted Berlusconi, to vote for the LNP to give a warn-
ing to Berlusconi who needs to change his mind and 
be in line with the French President Sarkozy.
The cultural and religious demonization of Muslims 
is amplified to benefit the LN. As Maneri (2001) states, 
immigration is the favorite object of global moral panic 
discourses. Fear surrounding immigration is pertinent for 
political parties such as the LN because of the enormous 
potential for boosting political consensus that a fear of the 
cultural “Other” provides. In the Italian context, such a 
strategy is to a large degree free of risk; the Muslim is an 
historical alien and is excludable—legally, socially, and 
symbolically—from the “moral” Christian community of 
the northern Italian regions. But the issue is more than 
theological, and at times fear relating to the murderous 
potential of a terrorist attack is second to the assumed loss 
of beauty and virtue that Islam is believed to endorse.
According to the LN, the most important values of the 
Padani are la Chiesa and la famiglia (the religion and the 
family).10 Using the institution of the family, and specifically 
marriage, the “moral entrepreneur” induces discourses of 
moral panic around Islam to warn of the “danger” of mixed 
marriages, their failure, and the concomitant loss of freedom 
for Padania women that conversion to Islam would entail.
Addressing marriages between Christians and Muslims, 
the newspaper Il Padano, in its article titled “Drama and 
Failures, Marriages With Muslims Are True Funerals” 
(2009), argues,
Mixed marriages with the Muslims are increasingly at 
risk. Even without mentioning recent cases [which 
are] in the [media] attention (the Moroccan arrested on 
charges of killing his partner and daughter, after the 
baptism of the child occurred in his absence, or the 
Egyptian who killed the son of 10 years for revenge 
against the woman who left him) the unions between 
Padanian women and immigrant Muslims have disas-
trous results. Indeed, the constant failure of the mar-
riages with the Muslims bring down the average 
“success” of mixed marriages. That is certainly tragic, 
almost nine unions between Padanians and foreigners 
are bound to fail soon.
Cardinal Giacomo Biffi, when he was the archbishop of 
Bologna, argued strongly to discourage marriages with the 
Muslims. His appeal, quite evidently, is still valid (Il Padano, 
2009b).
A billboard (see Figure 1)11 used by the LN regional can-
didate of the LN Jari Colla at the Lombardia regional elec-
tion of 2010—and subsequently promoted by the Movimento 
Studentesco Padano (Padania students’ movement)—rein-
forces these differences.
The billboard depicts two Muslim women covered head-
to-toe in long dresses and head veils that reveal only the 
eyes. The picture on the right represents two blonde-haired 
young girls in their late teens wearing ordinary jeans and 
T-shirts, smiling and hugging each other. Their clothing does 
not hide their femininity, albeit they are not sexualized. To a 
Western eye, they portray freedom and possibly optimism; 
the Islamic women suggest a life of submission. The two pic-
tures contrast the supposedly limitless potential of the 
Padania girls with the restrictions on freedom to which their 
Muslim counterparts are subject.
The billboard seems carefully structured to produce a 
sense of oppression and to promote a negative judgment of 
the Muslim way of life. This binary opposition seeks to 
underline the incompatibility of the two cultural models but 
it is also a warning for all women who embrace mixed mar-
riages to be careful of the mortification of their femininity 
and the humiliation they will inevitably experience in the 
name of Islam.
Conclusion
I do not believe in a moderate Islam. In the rest of the 
world, Christians are killed by the followers of Allah
—Mario Canossa (LN, cited by Cravero, 2011)
Figure 1. We love women without veil
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According to Cohen (2005), the moral panic is produced 
by the interaction of several actors: the media, the agents of 
social control, the political class, and the actions of influen-
tial groups. Does what has been presented here thus consti-
tute a Moral Panic? Let’s look at the evidence. The LN’s 
astute use of its media outlets permits it to label minority 
groups and incite moral debate and outrage. Via constant 
repetitions, these versions of reality are presented or identi-
fied as the truth and used to interpret reality (Domanski, 
2003). The LN claims to influence the media and the agents 
of social control. Both the police personnel and the Minister 
they answer to assume the important role of being seen to 
tackle the immediate danger represented by “Them.” 
Perceptions of the immediate danger are accentuated by the 
arrest of potential Muslim terrorists, ably assisted, it would 
seem, by politicians mobilizing the people and proposing 
emergency laws to fight the Muslim threat. Meanwhile, 
other legislation is proposed to outlaw that which is not a 
physical danger but a danger to the everyday norm, notably 
the burqa as worn by some Muslim women.12 The opening 
of mosques is opposed—for the LN, the beliefs promoted 
within are the antithesis of the civilized Judea-Christian 
world.13 Legislation has subsequently entered the statute 
books with the aim of promoting the commemoration of 
“Us” via ceremonies that celebrate the victory over both 
centralist (domestic) interests and expansionist Islam. 
Common stereotypes that encourage ethnic antagonism are 
promoted. Media articles focus their attention on the immi-
nent danger of the Islamic invasion, in the actual number of 
immigrants and the potential danger represented by the 
arrival of others should Turkey attain EU status. For further 
emotional response, the LN use Christianity and the symbol 
of the family as something integral to northern regional tra-
ditions. Via its various moral panic-inducing discourses, the 
LN seeks to build a shared imaginary based on notion of 
domestic security while legitimizing its subtle, neo-racist 
ideology (Back & Solomos, 2000).
Identity is as much about exclusion as it is about inclu-
sion; the critical factor is the social boundary which defines 
the group with respect to other groups over and above the 
cultural reality within those borders (Erjavec, 2003). As 
such, the moral panic is a tool used to reinforce the imagi-
nary identity of the Popolo Padano (and promote the success 
of the LN political strategy to detach the northern regions of 
Italy from the rest). This is evident in the mutual support 
proffered by the actors and entrepreneurs of the moral panic: 
the LN media, the LN itself, and particularly its senior politi-
cians. The various groups connected politically to the LN, 
together with the external support of forces of social control, 
help to shape the borders of the Padania community. Those 
who fight the Muslim threat are portrayed as the (Christian) 
Knights of Goodness. They utilize the rhetoric that sets the 
moral panic against a target (an enemy in fact) that is rela-
tively powerless politically; they thus confirm the theory. 
The Muslim community in northern Italy is consistently 
discriminated against as Ezzeddin Elzir, the President of the 
Union of the Islamic Community in Italy, explained in an 
official letter sent in September 2010 to the Italian President 
of the Republic, Giorgio Napolitano (StranieriinItalia.it, 
2010).
Behind these anti-Islam discourses lies not only an effort 
to represent the imaginary nation of Padania but also the very 
survival of the LN. Its political strategy depends heavily on 
ad hoc enemies. The discourse around Padanian security in 
the face of Islamic migration is crucial to this dynamic. Fear-
led discourses based on the belief of an immediate danger and 
constant emergency make the sense of being and defending 
Padania important. Images and words assist in the construc-
tion of boundaries. But the idea of Padania is a fantasy. The 
moral panic helps sustain the fantasy. The LN’s anti-Muslim 
discourse which fuels Moral Panic has been reinforced by the 
so-called Arab Spring; the LN’s political exponents spoke 
several times against regime-change in Tunisia and Libya. 
Lorenzo Fontana—a LN MEP and member of the European 
parliament foreign commission—renamed the Arab spring 
the “Islam spring,” highlighting the danger of these changes 
in regime. In an interview titled “Islamic Wave” he stated,
Before everyone else I was able to report that the Arab 
spring could lead to the replacement of undemocratic 
regimes with extreme Islamist-inspired movements, 
even if there were statements stressing the moderation 
of the new movements; I think objectively difficult for 
new governments supported by these movements to 
achieve a genuine democratic change in their coun-
tries. (Fontana, 2011)
This story is a product of moral panic and moral crusade. 
Anthropology can assist our analysis. The tome “Race and 
History” written by French anthropologist Claude Levi-
Strauss was an attempt to discredit the biological notions of 
“race” which animated Hitlerism (his insights were part of 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization’s [UNESCO] 1952 Statement on Race). He 
argued that anthropology committed a momentous error in 
confusing the idea of race, in the purely biological sense, 
with the sociological and psychological productions of 
human civilizations. This honest intellectual mistake led to 
the “unintentional justification of all forms of discrimination 
and exploitation” (Levi-Strauss, 1952, p. 5). We can see this 
confusion in perceptions of Islam and Islamic civilization, 
where the products of specific historical and sociological cir-
cumstances are lazily reduced to so-called biological pro-
pensities. When Levi-Strauss spoke of the contributions of 
different races of men to civilization, he accounted for them 
by geography, history, and sociology, not “by special apti-
tudes inherent in the anatomical or physiological make-up of 
the black, yellow or white man” (Levi-Strauss, 1952, p. 6). 
He also argued that cultures had collaborated throughout his-
tory. Propelling this process of collaboration were two 
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conflicting currents: one tending toward unification, the 
other toward the maintenance or restoration of diversity:
As a result of the position of each period or culture in 
the system, as a result of the way it is facing, each 
thinks that only one of these two currents represents an 
advance, while the other appears to be the negation of 
the first. But we should be purblind if we said, as we 
might be tempted to do, that humanity is constantly 
unmaking what it makes. For, in different spheres and 
at different levels, both currents are in truth two aspects 
of the same process. (Levi-Strauss, 1952, p. 49)
Again, we can see this tension in the dynamic between 
minority Muslim populations and representatives of “indig-
enous” culture. Here members of the “dominant” culture and 
the Muslim community are conflicted over the degree to 
which assimilation and accommodation should occur.
We can, however, present a wider picture which locates 
the structure of the moral panic within the agency that is the 
lived reality of the Italian body politic. Clearly, an outsider 
group is stereotyped and presented as a threat to established 
societal values. In these processes is evident the symbolism, 
distortion, and exaggeration that Cohen (1972) would recog-
nize. Causation—granted not very analytical—is offered by 
the LN analysts as are images of the Folk Devil. The imple-
mentation of new laws suggests that the societal control 
element of Cohen’s model fits the reality in this case. But we 
can step back here and question the notion of boundaries in a 
society that is prone to political turmoil, evidences ancient 
and still vociferous regional antagonisms, and just 25 years 
ago witnessed citizens massacring fellow citizens in the cause 
of political ideologies of the left and right.14 The same society 
has the most number of statutes of any nation in a legal sys-
tem that is best described as both labyrinthine and Byzantine.
The Islamic migrants may—both innocently and at times 
deliberately—test the boundaries of religious tolerance and 
may be a visible reminder of the global processes that have 
affected Italy. But the newly arrived do not seek to over-
throw the state or change the political system. Some—the 
moderates we assume, their numbers unknown—seek to 
remove the symbol of Christianity from places where they 
meet and teach in. The fanatics seek to destroy that which 
offends them. Alongside a moral panic is a concomitant 
moral crusade which fits the socially conservative and pro-
Catholic demographic of the LN. Raising the status of the 
Muslim threat, the protagonists of the LN are acting in char-
acter; theirs is a party that in origin coalesced around causes 
and responds well to slogans and fears surrounding the 
migrant. In such matters, the LN is happy to claim owner-
ship. In the schema of Ben-Yehuda and Goode (1994), the 
LN manage to raise concern and hostility, but this is achieved 
via its own media which should not be equated with any 
notion of state response or “state control.” Actually, when 
the LN was leading the country under former Prime Minister 
Silvio Berlusconi, the position of the Italian government 
regarding Islam was not consistent or homogeneous. 
Although there were at times declarations against a noniden-
tified Islamic extremist, the PdL was different from the LN 
in its pronouncements on Islam; this was mainly due to the 
political nature of the PdL, being a combination of different 
political components—socialist, Christian democratic and 
conservative. Its position is thereby moderated and rejects 
the LN’s homogeneous ideology. In this regard, it is impor-
tant to stress that in 2005, under PM Sivlio Berlusconi and 
the Home Office leadership of the PdL senator Giorgio 
Pisanu (a former Christian democrat), the Consulta per l’ 
Islam Italiano (the Committee for the Italian Islam) was 
instituted for the first time in Italy. Pisanu’s Committee was 
composed of defenders of Italian Muslims and was tasked 
with advising the minister of home office in his attempts to 
improve the social integration of the Italian Muslims. In 
2010, under the LN leadership of the Home Office, this 
Committee was replaced by a less representative body.
The LN is the ideological apparatus of a region and, more 
specifically, of those who have failed to attract more than 
10% of the national electorate. The panic that the LN seeks 
to inspire is in part Elite-Engineered and draws upon Grass-
Roots antipathy to the recent migrations of a variety of peo-
ple to the Italian mainland. The LN Interest-Group has 
members in high offices of government and claims it can 
influence policy. The Folk Devil thus exists in the sense of 
panic and the imagination of the crusader. The construction 
of moral panics, together with the construction of otherness, 
is crucial in the LN’s attempt to build—and sustain—its 
sense of shared identity. The promotion of otherness is based 
not so much on objective differences but on the discourses 
that a social group or individual constructs to stigmatize 
another group, underlining perceived faults while devaluing 
them and making them prone to discrimination. This also 
serves to strengthen the Self by promoting a feeling of supe-
riority (Staszak, 2008).
The Folk Devil is the fanatical male Islamic terrorist who 
seeks to avenge the Christian place of worship that depicts 
the prophet being insulted, challenges the sanctity of la 
Famiglia and, if left to his own devices, would conceal the 
bella figura that is so integral to the Italian concept of femi-
ninity. But this Folk Devil is hard to find and seemingly 
requires the intervention of the specialist squads of the Italian 
state security system. This may not be a comfort because the 
devil—as Catholics well versed in the concept of Evil 
know—is ephemeral but everywhere, waiting to tempt and 
strike.
Presumably only a vote for the LN can save the region 
(and maybe the nation) from a destiny decided by the fanat-
ics of Islam. A Faustian pact might thus be sought by some, 
which would be in keeping with the coalitions that typify 
Italian politics.
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Notes
 1. See Facebook page Lega Nord sez. di Castelli Calepio http://
facebook.com/group.php?gid=75995895681
 2. See http://www.radicalifvg.it/Risultati.html
 3. See http://inhouse.lau.edu.lb/bima/papers/Ottavia.pdf
 4. The Pontida gathering in 2010 can be seen at http://www.you-
tube.com/watch?v=O1V7TtekcgU
 5. http://mgpbassabresciana.leganord.org/loghi/CARTAdeiVAL-
ORI_MGP2.pdf
 6. Any analysis that fits the category of Moral Panic has to real-
ize that it is a paradigm that has been utilized to explain a 
variety of phenomena. A single-loop regenerative feedback 
pertinent to deviance amplification (see Wilkins, 1964) was 
derived from cybernetics (see Maruyama, 1963). It has appli-
cability to 17th-century religious persecution in Puritan New 
England (Erikson, 1966) constructs around mental illness 
(Scheff, 1966), the creation of misbehaviors around youth 
subcultures in an English seaside town (Cohen, 1972), social 
reactions to drug takers in West London (Young, 1971), the 
construct of crime waves in the bureaucracy of English polic-
ing (Ditton, 1979), and as an explanation as to the appearance 
of “Mugging” in Birmingham in the mid-1970s (Hall et al., 
1978), as an explanation as to the sequences behind the Inner 
City riots that spread throughout England in the summer of 
1981 (Lea & Young, 1982), and to explain the general applica-
tion of the term Hooligan in over a century of English crime 
reports (Pearson, 1983).
 7. Document retrieved from http://www.padaniaoffice.org/pdf/
mozioni/mozione_crocifisso.pdf (Milan, November 6, 2009)
 8. See www.vivereancona.it/index.php?page=articolo&articolo_
id=264517
 9. Member of the European Parliament Alberto Torazzi. Radio 
Padania Libera 29-05-2009
10. See http://leganord.org/elezioni/2008/lega/famiglia/Famiglia.
pdf
11. See http://.jaricolla.com/senza-categoria/perche-a-noi-le-donne/
12. In 2010, the Lega Nord (LN) has presented a law proposal 
to forbid the burqa to make a common front with President 
Sarkozy’s France that implemented such a ban in 2010. See 
http://iltempo.it/2010/09/18/1201369-francesco_alfani_testa_
europa_francia_messo_parte_berretto_frigio_coccarda_
rossa_bianca_rivoluzionari_indossato_elmetto_della_polizia 
_mettere_ordine_caos_multiculturale_delle_banlieue_approv.
shtml
13. We refer to the latest (2011) LN initiative to block the con-
struction of a proposed Mosque in Turin, Italy’s third larg-
est city. The plan to stop the project via judicial appeal to the 
Regional Administrative Tribunal (TAR), was instigated by 
the local MP Stefano Allasia who argued, “We are concerned 
that Torino will become another Alexandria (Egypt),” a refer-
ence to the 2010 New Year’s Eve massacre that occurred in 
Egypt that saw bombs placed outside the church of the minor-
ity Christian Coptic resulting in 21 deaths. The perpetrators 
were believed to be Muslim extremists. See http://torino.
repubblica.it/cronaca/2011/01/03/news/torino_dice_si_alla_
moschea_e_ora_scontro_con_la_lega-10797528/
14. We are referring to Gli anni di Piombo (The Years of Lead) a 
period of terrorism for Italy; during the 1970s and 1980s left- 
and right-wing militants clashed on the streets of the country. 
See Galli (1986).
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